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"CATCH-22": THE ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONS IN PROMOTING GENDER
EQUALITY IN LAND LAW - LESSONS LEARNED

IN POST-CONFLICT PLURALIST AFRICA
Amrita Kapur*
This article explores the contours of development policies as they
have been applied to pluralisticlegal systems, with a specificfocus on their
effects on women in post-conflict African countries. Drawing on research
thatfirmly establishes the importanceof women's social, economic and political participationin post-conflict development, it identifies the flaws in
gender-neutralland titling initiatives introducedand encouragedby development institutions. It then describes the gender-sensitivelaws enacted as a
response to continuing gender discriminatory practices in Rwanda,
Mozambique and Uganda. While taking into account the existence of customary law, these laws explicitly affirm women's rights with respect to
land, property and inheritance.
However, the central government's reliance on local informal governance structures to apply and enforce these laws creates a "Catch-22"
situation, whereby the local elites with the power to enforce the law are
precisely the people who continue to apply gender-discriminatorycustomary norms, particularly with respect to land rights. The experiences of the
threeprogressivesocieties mentioned above are analyzed to provide insight
* Amrita Kapur is the International Advisor for the Women's Justice Unit with
JSMP, a human rights organization in Timor-Leste. She has previously worked for
the International Development Law Organization, the International Center for
Transitional Justice, and the International Criminal Court, and practiced domestic
criminal law in Australian courts as a Legal Aid lawyer and Prosecution Officer.
Amrita holds a Masters degree in International Law from New York University
where she was awarded an International Human Rights Fellowship, in addition to
psychology and law degrees from UNSW, Australia. She can be contacted at
ms.amrita@gmail.com.
The author would like to thank Prof. Frank Upham for his comments and
encouragement, and the participants of the 2009 NYU Emerging Human Rights
Scholars Conference. All errors are the author's alone.
Please note, an article by the author is cited in this piece: Amrita Kapur,
Two Faces of Change: The Need for a Bi-DirectionalApproach to Improve Women's Land Rights in PluralLegal Systems. This article was published as Paper No.
2 of the IDLO Customary Justice Working Papers Series in 2010. It is available
online at: http://www.idlo.int/Download.aspx?Id=222&LinkUrl=Publications/WP2
Mozambique.pdf&FileName=WP2Mozambique.pdf.
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into how statutory and customary systems can develop from divergent conflicting legal orders into a more synthesized union of laws which protects
women's land rights and is universally enforced.
INTRODUCTION

A forty-year collage of development policies has reduced poverty
for eighty percent of the world's population.' However, these policies have
also left the remaining bottom billion - seventy percent of whom live in
Africa - in development traps characterized by lower life expectancy,
higher infant mortality and long-term malnutrition compared to other developing countries. 2 The current approach to development, epitomized by the
United Nations' Millennium Development Goals, is universal in application, generic in focus, and identifies outcomes, but not specific strategies, to
overcome the development obstacles that continue to plague the bottom
billion. 3
This one-size-fits-all approach is exemplified by the wholesale exportation of formal title registration systems into pluralistic African legal
systems. The World Bank's support and implementation of titling registration - inspired by de Soto's theory4 - failed to stimulate the expected substantial economic development in numerous countries within which it was
put into practice. In post-conflict pluralistic African countries, the lack of
success is particularly noticeable and regrettable: first, because formal titling was heralded as a comprehensive remedy for stagnant economies, 5 and
second, because of the immense potential for improvement in a predominantly economically underdeveloped region.
There is a wealth of institutional and development wisdom that has
yet to be incorporated into development agencies' policies and projects to

I

PAUL COLLIER, THE

BoTroM

BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE
FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 7-8 (2007).

See id.
3 Id. at 190.
2

Hernando de Soto is a Peruvian economist known for his work on the informal
economy and the importance of property rights. Broadly, his theory posits that formalizing informal rights to land would allow the poor to use their land as collateral,
which would form the basis of entrepreneurship, stimulating the economy; this is
critiqued below in Parts III.A and III.B.
5 While development is possible without growth, the discussion below is predicated on the absolute lack (not the incorrect type) of growth in the "bottom billion"
countries, and an understanding that economic growth is "the core challenge of
development" in countries experiencing negative growth rates in both absolute and
relative terms. COLLIER, supra note 1, at I1.
4
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stimulate economic progress. Specifically, abundant evidence shows that
women's economic participation and land rights are crucial to development,
and that both are particularly important in post-conflict African societies
because of the economy's reliance on land and the more economically-active roles assumed by women. 6 It is therefore somewhat surprising that the
funding and project focus of development institutions, such as the World
Bank, does not reflect this understanding.7
This article suggests that development policies targeting property
rights will more successfully promote economic development by empowering women as property rights-holders. However, this can only be achieved
if the gender bias inherent in customary power structures and practices is
considered and addressed. For a number of reasons, institutions influential
in directing development resources in Africa should see post-conflict societies as particularly critical and receptive sites for development aid and policies. Further, development policies will have optimal impact if they
prioritize women's economic participation by promoting and incentivizing
the enforcement of stable property rights for women in both customary and
formal law.
The heart of the dilemma, the reason de Soto's titling program has
failed particularly in pluralist countries, and the challenge in implementing
this proposal, lies in the "Catch-22" confronting any formal approach. Any
property system must be administered locally because post-conflict central
governments inevitably lack the institutional resources and funds to effectively administer a comprehensive property law scheme. Local structures8
are invariably dominated by male local elites, who continue to enforce gender-discriminatory customary norms rather than gender-neutral formal
property law. The issues to address then are, first, how to ensure that formal
law offers sufficiently secure land rights to women, and second, how to
persuade or coerce local governance structures to apply formal law.
In answering these questions, this article adopts the following approach. Part I very broadly traces the evolving theories of economic development as shaped by the World Bank, particularly with respect to land
rights and the participation of women. Part II examines these issues in the
customary law context, as well as the contemporary dynamics of customary
practices. Part III explores the theory behind the formal titling regime and
6
7

8

See infra Part III.D.
Id.
I use the term "local" to indicate the level of governance, and the term "custom-

ary law" to indicate traditional cultural norms. Thus, local structures can be used to
apply and administer formal law locally, either through existing traditional structures, or through newly created formal structures at the local level.
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its consequences in pluralistic contexts. Part IV focuses on Rwanda,
Mozambique and Uganda as three post-conflict pluralist African case studies where negotiating the "Catch-22" situation has partially succeeded in
protecting women's rights to land. Part V extrapolates from the theory and
case studies to suggest further avenues to overcome the "Catch-22." Based
on an understanding of intersecting systems of rights, the article analyzes
how formal law may be better operationalized to enhance women's land
rights, rather than focusing on reform possibilities within local and customary structures.
PART

1:

CHANGING DEVELOPMENT IDEOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION

Part I traces the effects of development policies and discusses the
contemporary understanding of essential development criteria, particularly
in relation to land rights and the participation of women. The significance
of imposing property titling as a development strategy in Africa derives
from a number of factors: first, recent development strategies - particularly
those of the World Bank - have targeted property titling reform as a prerequisite for development; second, "land is at the heart of social, political
and economic life in most African economies[,]" 9 so the appropriateness of
property rights is especially critical to development in Africa; and third,
participation of women in the local economy, now recognized as essential
in promoting development, hinges on the enforcement of their land rights.' 0
A.

A Brief Survey of Development Approaches

Over and above the legacy of colonialism, Paul Collier recently
identified four "development traps" responsible for the total lack of development in the "bottom billion" states: conflict, a lack of natural resources,
being landlocked with "bad neighbors," and bad governance." Unquestionably, many of the poorest African nations have also endured the effects of
misconceived and badly implemented development strategies promulgated
by Western nations and financial institutions, particularly the World Bank.12
An appreciation of the current effects of these development theories and the
"Catch-22" paradigm they have created in the "bottom billion" African
9 Camilla Toulmin, Securing Land and Property Rights in Sub-SaharanAfrica:
The Role of Local Institutions, 26 LAND USE POL'Y 10 (2008).
10 BINA AGARWAL, A FIELD OF ONE'S OWN: GENDER AND LAND RIGHTS IN
SOUTH ASIA xv
"
12

(1994).

COLLIER, supra note 1, at 5.
JEFFERY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR

TIME 189-90 (2005).
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countries requires an understanding of the evolution of the development
field and its institutions.
Since its inception, the World Bank has played a formative role in
articulating, implementing and modifying development ideology, which in
effect determines whether countries are worthy recipients of Western aid.' 3
The World Bank's agenda setting has particularly shaped African states'
post-colonial "economic recovery" because of Africa's dependence on aid.
Shifts in several African government policies are reflections of World Bank
policy developments, from the 1950s advocacy of a pro-active state, to a
1970s neo-classical market-oriented paradigm, to the late 1980s focus on
liberal governments and improved economic policies in a capitalist market.14 The result in the "bottom billion" countries" is profoundly disheartening: a per capita income decline of 0.4 percent, life expectancy of fifty
years, infant mortality of fourteen percent, and a thirty-six percent incidence of malnourished children.16 In Africa, the number of poor people
nearly doubled over the period of globalization - from 200 million in 1981
to 380 million in 2005 - with half the population of sub-Saharan Africa
living below the $1.25 a day poverty line. If the current trend continues, at
least a billion people will still live below the poverty line in 2015, with a
third of these living in Africa.' 7
Fortunately, the significance of these statistics has not been ignored: at its 2004 Annual Meeting, the World Bank announced reducing
poverty as its focus,' 8 which is now reflected in its stated mission.' 9 The
institution's approach to reducing poverty was articulated at the 2005 An13 RICHARD SANDBROOK,

THE POLITICS OF AFRICA'S ECONOMIC

RECOVERY

2

(Robin Cohen et al. eds., 1993).
'4

Id.

African countries in this group include: Somalia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria,
Tanzania, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire, Togo, The
Gambia, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, Burundi, Madagascar, Lesotho,
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Malawi, and Cameroon. See
COLLIER, supra note 1, at 25, 36, 30, 165, 69, 33, 130, 126, 59, 55, 40, 151, 84,
1

132, 23, 138, 179, 53, 21, 26, 10, 64, 79, respectively.
See id. at 7-8, 9.

16

17 SHAOHUA CHEN

&

MARTIN RAVALLION, THE DEVELOPING WORLD IS POORER

THAN WE THOUGHT, BUT

No

LESS SUCCESSFUL IN THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY,

World Bank Development Research Group, 25 (2008).
18 ELIZABETH BECKER, World Bank Meeting to Focus on Poverty, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/24/business/world-

bank-meeting-to-focus-on-poverty.html.
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nual Meeting by Paul Wolfowitz, who stated, "we cannot make headway in
the fight against poverty without supporting equality before the law and the
legal empowerment of the poor." 20 In 2006, the High Commission for Legal
Empowerment of the Poor was launched, and a World Bank Action Agenda
was formulated. 2 1 The scope of "legal empowerment of the poor" is threefold: (1) setting a coherent "legal order" through the reform of the judiciary;
(2) tackling informality through simplification of business regulations; and
(3) formalizing property rights mainly through legal land titling programs. 22
It is this last approach, emphatically advanced by Hernando de Soto and
unreservedly implemented by the World Bank, which is critiqued here in
the context of post-conflict African pluralistic legal systems.
B.

Land Rights and Development

"The institutional arrangements under which a person gains access
to land largely determines, among other things, what crops he can grow,
how long he can till a particular piece of land, his rights over the fruits of
his labor and his ability to undertake long term improvements on the
land." 23 Land rights, customary or formal, "act both as a form of economic
access to key markets and as a form of social access to nonmarket institutions, such as the household and community-level governance structures." 24
In economic terms, an effective system of property rights is a public good
as it encourages investment by property-holders and acts as a central element of capital and credit markets. State intervention is typically necessary
to establish national systems of land administration to enforce property
rights and bear the costs of providing a standardized property system. 25 To
that extent, establishing and enforcing property rights is linked to social
order, and, importantly, also to the perception of social order. Without a
19 WORLD BANK, BANK INFORMATION CENTRE, Overview, http://www.bicusa.org/
en.Institutioninstitution.5.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
20

ANA PALACIo, LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR: AN ACTION AGENDA FOR

THE WORLD BANK
21 Id. at 3.

3 (2006).

22

Id. at 6.

23

GEORGE BENNEH,
OF

PROCEEDINGS

AGROFORESTRY 163
24 Renee Giovarelli

Land tenure and agroforestryland use systems in Ghana, in

AN

INTERNATIONAL

WORKSHOP

ON

TENURE

ISSUES

IN

(1987).
et al., Gender Issues and Best Practicesin Land Administra-

tion Projects 3 (2009), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/
Resources/Genderland fulltxt.pdf.
25

See KLAUS

DEININGER, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION

57, 117 (2003).
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legitimate and capable government, the allocation and enforcement of rights
may cause conflict when different claimants resort to "competing legal, normative and coalitional enforcement mechanisms." 26 Moreover, growing evidence suggests that a more equal distribution of assets, including land, leads
to faster growth. 27
The World Bank's approach to land rights can be roughly summarized as follows: action must be taken to create land tenure security because
increasing land tenure insecurity in most parts of the world forms an obstacle to investment and growth. 28 In the 1980s, the Bank addressed this issue
through land titling and registration as part of its structural adjustment
agenda, predicting greater security of tenure through the abolition of customary tenure. 29 In the 1990s, the Bank shifted its approach, conceding that
in a few instances customary tenure did not inevitably adversely affect agricultural production, but nevertheless maintained its previous position that
formalization and titling was ultimately the superior scenario. 30 The definition of land rights is now regarded as centrally important to economic
growth, the effective use of land as a resource, efforts at poverty reduction,
and good governance. 31 As the analysis below illustrates, the relationship
between land rights and development is more complex than represented by
the Bank's current ideology.
C.

The ParticularImportance of Land Rights in Africa

A complete understanding of the relationship between property
rights and economic development is especially critical in the context of Africa. First, in most African countries, agriculture supports the survival and
Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in PropertyRights Systems: The Third
World Tragedy of ContestedAccess, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1010 (2006).
27 See Klaus Deininger & Lyn Squire, Economic Growth and Income Inequality:
Re-examiningthe Links, FINANCE & DEV. 38, 40-41(1997) (noting a possible expla26

nation for this phenomenon is that the effects of inequality in asset ownership are
transmitted through financial markets).
28 Volker Stamm, The World Bank on Land Policies: A West African Look at the
World Bank Policy Research Report, AFRICA 2 (2004), http://findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi hb3lO3/is_4_74/ain29150959/pg_2.
29 See Taylor Brown, Contestation, Confusion and Corruption: Market-Based
Land Reform in Zambia, in COMPETING JURISDICTIONS: SETTLING LAND CLAIMS IN
AFRICA 79, 80 (Sandra Evers et al. ed., 2005).
30 Ambreena Manji, Capital, Labour and Land Relations in Africa: A Gender
Analysis of the World Bank's Policy Research Report on Land Institutions and
Land Policy, 24(l) THIRD WORLD Q. 97, 98 (2003).
31
See DEININGER, supra note 25, at 11.
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well being of up to seventy percent of the population, 32 employs some sixty
percent of the labor, and accounts for twenty percent of merchandise exports. 33 Agriculture represents thirty-three percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in sub-Saharan countries, and up to seventy-six percent of GDP
in some states. 34 For the economies of the majority of African nations, the
family farm is essential. When conditions are right, the family farm is still
regarded as being highly productive and quick to respond to new markets
and other opportunities.35 Africa's private sector is largely composed of
family farms, and small to medium sized enterprises; in sub-Saharan Africa
over ninety-six percent of farmers farm small farms. 36 Thus, the effects of
any property rights regime are far-reaching and foundational for economic
prosperity, or lack thereof.
Second, the importance of land is heightened by the explosive population growth and market development across the continent. Africa's urban
population increased nine-fold between 1950 and 2000, while its rural population increased by 265 percent. 3 7 It is the fastest urbanizing continent in
the world.3 8 Moreover, this growth has manifested in the form of informal
settlements where land ownership is unclear.39 For example, an estimated
seventy-two percent of the African urban population lives in slums without
any form of secure tenure. 4 0 Consequently, competition over land has inRose Gawaya, Investing in Women Farmersto Eliminate Food Insecurity in
Southern Africa: Policy-related Research from Mozambique, 16(1) GENDER &
32

DEv.

147, 147 (2008).

FAQ and the New Partnershipfor Africa's Development (NEPAD): A Partnership for Africa's Agriculture, FAO.ORG, http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/AC735E/
33

AC735EOO.HTM (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
34 Jacques Diouf, The Challenge of Agricultural Development in Africa, Address
at the Sir John Crawford Memorial Lecture (Nov. 2, 1989), in Consultative Group
on Int'l Agric. Research Publ'ns, Nov. 1989, at 3.
35 Toulmin, supra note 9, at 11.
36

Dunstan Spencer, Will They Survive? Prospectsfor Small Farmers in Sub-

SaharanAfrica, Conference Report, Sustainable Food Security for All By 2020,
(Sept. 4-6, 2001), available at http://www.ifpri.org/2020conference/PDF/summary-spencer.pdf.
Camilla Toulmin, Securing land and property rights in Africa: The role of local
institutions, in How TO MAKE POVERTY HISTORY (Tom Bigg & David Satt37

terthwaite eds., 2005).
38

Id.

39 Id.

Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, Exec. Dir., UN-HABITAT, Address at the UNHABITAT Conference on Land in Africa: Market Asset or Secure Livelihood?
40
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creased, fostering conflict between classes and neighbors, and within
tightly-knit communities and families. 4 1 Clarifying and enforcing these
rights is therefore critical not only because urban tenure issues are extremely complex and contestable, but also because of the broader implications for social harmony. 42
Finally, land rights assume particular importance in countries recovering from conflict, where establishing peaceful relationships between
competing groups depends on objective, transparent, and fair distribution of
property. 43 Paul Collier identifies conflict as a recurring threat for countries
with largely stagnant economies: "a typical low-income country faces a risk
of civil war of about 14 percent in any five-year period," with each extra
percentage point of growth reducing the risk of civil war by a corresponding percentage point." A quarter of all African countries are currently enduring the effects of armed conflict, one-fifth of Africans live in countries
disrupted by conflict, and the number of African conflict casualties exceeds
that of all other regions combined. 4 5 Thus, the stakes are highest for postconflict Africa, where land law that successfully promotes economic
growth has the greatest potential to avoid further conflict.
D.

Women's Participationas Critical to Economic Development

"[W]ithout the advancement of women, development itself will be
difficult to achieve." 46 This symbiotic relationship derives from the
gendered discrepancy in poverty rates, the benefits flowing from increased
economic participation by women, and, in the seventy-three percent of
countries in the "bottom billion" suffering the effects of conflict, 47 the value
of women's leadership in post-conflict rebuilding.
In the first instance, any strategy that effectively combats poverty in
the developing world must focus on women simply because women comprise the majority of those in poverty, suffering not just from an income of
(Jan. 14, 2005), available at http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=1220&catid= I4&typeid=8&subMenuld=0#.
41

SARA BERRY,

No

CONDITION IS PERMANENT: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF AGRA-

RIAN CHANGE IN SUB-SAHARAN

AFRICA

116 (1993).

Tibaijuka, supra note 40.
43 Toulmin, supra note 9, at 12.
44 COLLIER, supra note 1, at 20.
45 World Bank, Conflict and Development, http://go.worldbank.org/8RCAT8X
KOO (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
46 E.S.C. Res. 1990/15, Annex
8, U.N.Doc. E/RES/1990/90 (May 24, 1990).
47 COLLIER, supra note 1, at 17.
42
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less than $1.2548 a day, but also inadequate health, nutrition, education and
lifestyle. 4 9 This "feminization of poverty" is characterized by higher numbers of women in more severe poverty than men, and rising rates of femaleheaded households.5 0 Causes for this phenomenon have been variously
ascribed to limits placed on female labor force participation including gender differences in access to formal employment, lack of access to credit, and
wage discrepancies. 5 1 Several of the identified factors relate back to lack of
access to land. 5 2
Even with significantly deficient data, 53 it is still clear that the gender discrepancy of the extremely poor has deepened across decades. A
study by the International Fund for Agricultural Development across fortyone developing countries accounting for eighty-four percent of the rural developing population found that over approximately twenty years, the gender
discrepancy in the increase of the number of people below the poverty line
was seventeen percent: there was a forty-seven percent increase in poverty
for women compared to thirty percent for men. 54 In 2004, women still comprised sixty percent of those below the poverty line. 5 Compounding this
The World Bank altered the benchmark figure from $1.00 to $1.25 to more
accurately reflect the cost of living. See Martin Ravallion et al., Dollara Day Revisited, (The World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No. 4620, 2008).
49 See generally Dir. of the Int'l Research and Training Inst. for the Advancement
of Women, Implementation of the programme of work for the period October
2004-May 2005: Progressreport on the InternationalResearch and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, U.N. Doc. INSTRAW/EB/2005/R.2/Rev.1
(Jun. 2, 2005).
50 JAIN DEVAKI, Development as if Women Mattered, 1986-1995, in WOMEN, DEVELOPMENT AND THE UN: A SIXTY-YEAR QUEST FOR EQUALITY AND JUSTICE 102,
107 (2005).
51 Id. at 111.
52 Carmen Diana Deere & Cheryl R. Ross, Genderand the Distributionof Wealth
in Developing Countries, (United Nations Univ. World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Research Paper No. 2006/115, 2006), available at http://www.wider.unu.
edu/publications/enGB/index-revised-2010/.
53 See DEININGER, supra note 25, at 38 (acknowledging that poverty measured by
household systematically ignores individual women and unpaid domestic work, and
that poverty statistics are not disaggregated according to sex).
54 Mayra Buvinic, Women in Poverty: A New Global Underclass, 108 FOR. POL'Y
38, 43 (1997).
55 Press Release, Int'l Labour Org., More Women Are Entering the Global Labour
Force Than Ever Before, But Job Equality, Poverty Reduction Remain Elusive
(Mar. 5, 2004), available at http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/press-and-media-centre/press-releases/WCMS_005243/lang-en/index.htm.
48
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disproportionate poverty is the disempowerment experienced by the combination of precarious and underpaid work, caring for children, and other unpaid household responsibilities. Women's lack of access to land, credit, and
better employment opportunities handicaps their ability to fend off poverty
for themselves and their families, or to rise out of it.56
Secondly, the logical corollary to the above is that the economic,
political and social participation of and leadership by women is essential to
development. Indeed, development organizations credit the World Bank's
realization of this truth in the World Development Report 2008.17 Oxfam
notes the critical message emerging from the report is that "gendered inequalities in access to, and participation in, markets, represent a significant
constraint on increasing agricultural productivity and growth; and [ ] improving the terms on which women engage in markets could have significant effects on economic growth and poverty reduction." 8 As Muhammad
Yunus found, this could be attributed to the fact that:
compared to men who spent money more freely, women
benefited their families much more. Women wanted to save
and invest and create assets, unlike men who wanted to enjoy right away. Women are more self-sacrificing, they want
to see their children better fed, better dressed and, as a result, the conditions of the entire community improved. 59
Further, access to land facilitates women's bargaining power within
their household, as well as their representation and participation in decision
making processes at the community level. 60 Agarwal argues that women's
ownership of land leads to improvements in women's welfare, productivity,

United Nations Development Program, Overview: Human Development to
EradicatePoverty, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997, 2, 6, available at http://

56

hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdrI 997_en overview.pdf.
57 Rebecca Holmes & Rachael Slater, Measuring Progress on Gender and Agriculture in the 1982 and 2008 World Development Reports, 16 GENDER & DEV. 27,
37 (2008).
58

Id.

Ishaan Tharoor, Paving the Way out of Poverty, Interview with Muhammed
Yunus, TIME MAGAZINE, Oct. 13 2006, available at http://www.time.com/time/
world/article/0,8599,1546100,00.html.
60 A Gender Perspective on Land Rights: Equal Footing, U.N. Food and Agric.
59

Org. 2, ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/y3495e/y3495e00.pdf (last visited Apr. 4,
2011); see also Deere & Ross, supra note 52, at 3.
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equality, and empowerment. 6 1 Similarly, a comparative analysis of Honduras and Nicaragua suggests a positive correlation between women's property rights and their overall role in the household economy: greater control
over agricultural income, higher shares of business and labor market earnings, and more frequent receipt of credit. In Honduras, women with land
rights in male-headed households produced higher incomes through their
own "microenterprises" than women without land rights. In Nicaragua, the
share of crop and livestock income was higher for women with land rights
in male-headed households compared to wives with no land rights. 62 Given
the above conclusions, it is self-evident that the enjoyment of secure property rights by women is essential for development and thus a necessary
focus for any well-intentioned government or development agency.
E. The Heightened Importance of Women in Post-Conflict African
Contexts

In Africa, the contribution of women's labor to the economy is already obvious: "[i]n sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean, women produce
up to 80 percent of basic foodstuffs." 63 Moreover, women's rights are particularly important in post-conflict African societies in which women become heads of households as widows, single mothers, or orphans.
Particularly for widows, control of land may be one of the few vehicles
through which elderly women can guarantee their economic security.64 If
economic growth depends on broad-based participation and if women comprise a majority of post-conflict societies, it follows that articulating welldefined property rights that enhance women's capacity to contribute to the
national economy is essential for economic development. Indeed, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 from 2000 encourages "gender mainstream65
ing" so that gender perspectives are addressed in the post-conflict context.
The "gender dividend" that allows women to occupy roles traditionally reserved for men and to acquire new sets of skills and social status as a result
See generally Bina Agarwal, "Bargaining"and Gender Relations: Within and
Beyond the Household, 3 FEMINIST EcoN. (1997) (arguing that when women do not
own land they are doubly at risk for poor outcomes, since they have no source of
income and no safety net).
62 See generally Elizabeth Katz & Juan Chamorro, Gender, Land Rights and the
Household Economy in Rural Nicaragua and Honduras, Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Latin American and Caribbean Economics Association,
Puebla, Mexico, October 9-11 (2002).
63 FAO Land Tenure Studies, Gender and Access to Land No. 4, 11 (2002).
64 Giovarelli et al., supra note 24, at 3.
65 S.C. Res. 1325, [ 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
61
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is one avenue which offers enormous potential for promoting women's
rights. 66
Decades of incoherent and at times contradictory development policies have left much of Africa economically stagnant, wracked by conflict,
and without appropriate strategies for growth. However, recent research
helpfully demonstrates that land rights and women's participation in the
economy are both essential ingredients for economic prosperity. In the postconflict African context, the importance of both elements is heightened.
Land rights are pivotal because of the largely agricultural African economies, increasing competition over land, and the risk of relapse into conflict
that is created by stagnant economies. The undisputed and unexplored potential for women to contribute to the economy is greatest post-conflict
when the "gender dividend" allows traditional barriers to employment,
leadership, asset ownership and civic participation to be dismantled.
A logical starting premise from which to address the particularly
billion" in post-conflict Africa is that the security of wo"bottom
fragile
men's land rights will be determinative of economic growth. For this reason, the analysis and following prescriptions focus on the importance of
establishing and enforcing women's property rights, particularly in postconflict pluralistic societies where gender inequality challenges are the most
formidable.
PART

A.

11:

ENCOUNTERING AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW

African Legal Plurality

In the context of African dependence on agriculture, increasing demand for land and post-conflict development, the effective legal enforcement of rights is paramount. This enforcement is especially important
because rights to land in Africa stem from several different sources: settlement, long occupation, government allocation, inheritance, gift, and market
transactions. 67 Similarly, property rights can be registered in various ways
and at different levels, dependent on different systems of authority for their
validation. "Community councils, patrilineal hierarchy, local government,
traditional leadership, irrigation authorities, city councils and land agencies" comprise a multiplicity of structures that may give rise to inconsistencies and ambiguity of title. 68 Consequently, security of property rights
Naomi R. Chan, Women in Post-ConflictReconstruction:Dilemmas andDirections, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 335, 337-38 (2006).
67 Susana Lastarria-Comhiel, Impact of Privatization on Gender and Property
Rights in Africa, 25 WORLD DEV. 1317, 1322 (1997).
68 Toulmin, supra note 9, at 13.
66
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depends on recognition of validity both by the state and the local
community.
Non-state governance mechanisms, commonly in the form of closeknit kinship networks applying customary traditions, predate the creation of
many African states. These customary traditions have evolved independently from, and often in contradiction to, state institutions. 69 Compounding
this plurality of authority is the fact that most "[African] central governments have neither the capacity nor the local knowledge to implement a
just, large-scale national land registration system," 70 resulting in only two to
ten percent of land in Africa being covered by formal tenure.7' Not only
does the gap between legality and legitimacy need to be navigated to effectively enforce land rights but the variable ways in which customary laws
operate must be completely understood and incorporated for any comprehensive system to be properly applied at the local community level. This
application in turn requires an analysis of other societal institutions that
exert the most influence on customary tenure systems, including family,
marriage, and inheritance structures.
B.

Customary Law Structures

The role of customary laws varies across countries and is shaped by
cultural interactions, population pressures, socio-economic change, political
processes, and manipulation by colonial and post-independence governments.7 2 One universal underlying distinction is between control of land
based on some type of recognized possession - customary or formal, temporary or permanent - and access to land, which entails some decisionmaking power over the production process, products and use of land, but
not ownership or possession. 73 Another general difference in land distribution trends is that resources - forests, water, and grazing land - are allocated to the community, and agricultural land is allocated to individual
households. 74 Because there is generally no further unclaimed land around
inhabited areas, agricultural land is now acquired through inter-household
Fitzpatrick, supra note 26, at 1011.
70 Toulmin, supra note 9, at 10.
71 DEININGER, supra nOte 25, at xxi.
72 Toulmin, supra note 9, at 14.
73 Lastarria-Cornhiel, supra note 67, at 1318.
74 Camilla Toulmin & Julian Quan, Evolving Land Rights, Tenure and Policy in
Sub-Saharan Africa, in EVOLVING LAND RIGHTS, POLICY AND TENURE 21-22
(2000).
69
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(sale or borrowing) or inter-generational (inheritance or gift) transfers. Inheritance is the most common type of transfer. 75
Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel notes that control of land is determined
largely by gender and class dynamics within the community. Specifically,
inheritance transfers generally preclude allocation and transfer of land to
women, whether they occur within a matrilineal or patrilineal system.
Transfers are to sons in patrilineal communities, and to nephews in matrilineal communities. Women are given access to land through a male relative such as her husband or father in patrilineal societies, or sometimes her
husband in matrilineal communities. Women have no inheritance rights in
either system, but a daughter who stays in her birth matrilineal community
can receive a small piece of family land as a gift from her father, to bequeath to whomever she wishes. Additionally, women in matrilineal societies retain cultivation rights on their birth family's land after marriage,
provided the women remain in their community. If a woman marries
outside the community, she is able to reclaim her cultivation rights upon
return to her birth community. These rights are not granted in patrilineal
societies. 76
A husband is obliged to provide arable land to his wife to farm,
which is generally used to grow food crops for the family, whereas the
husband's land grows cash crops. Importantly, upon divorce or separation a
woman loses cultivation rights to her husband's land, and can only reclaim
cultivation rights if she returns to a matrilineal birth community.77 Both
tenure systems are structured to enable communities to take care of themselves. While women possess only secondary rights, in circumstances of
sufficient land supply they nonetheless retain the means and access to land
to maintain their family.
C.

Current Operation of Customary Law

While formal laws are prone to being ignored or conspicuously unenforced in African communities relying on a parallel customary systems,
customary laws are particularly susceptible to contested interpretations in
situations of increased land scarcity leading to conflict, discrepancies with
formal systems, and weak state enforcement capacity.78 As noted above,
seventy-three percent of people in the societies of the "bottom billion" have
5 Lastarria-Comhiel, supra note 67, at 1319, 1322.

77
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recently been through a civil war or are still in one. 7 9 Since 1980, twentyeight sub-Saharan African countries have experienced war.80 These countries have faced overpopulation, environmental degradation, and increased
migration of refugees, all of which significantly contribute to ethnic and
territorial resource conflicts.8 ' The commercialization of agriculture and
land, restructuring programs, and urbanization have further weakened customary systems, increased individualization of rights, and released the family and community from traditional obligations to certain members, such as
women. 82
In facing these existential threats to traditional structures, the typical response of customary leaders has been to tighten customary governance mechanisms or enhance exclusionary rights through a process of
collective consensus that typically excludes women.8 3 Indeed, mounting
pressures to protect the clan system attributable to increased land scarcity
have caused local leaders to further constrain women's access to land
through renegotiation of both formal and informal traditional relationships.8 4 Many customary systems have come to entrench discrimination and
exclusion along status, age or gender lines. Worse, some have manipulated
traditional rules to consolidate legal entitlements and the subsequent economic advantages in the hands of a few customary chiefs.85
"If the situation of women regarding land and property rights,
whether under customary or statutory law, is precarious in times of peace, it
is even more so in situations of conflict."8 6 In many African countries,
where communal rights to land conflict with statutory laws that require title
deeds to establish rights over land, women's rights to land or other property
become even more uncertain after conflict87 or in a rapidly changing envisupra note 1, at 17.
80 Robin Luckman et al., Poverty v. Conflict: Understanding Africa's Wars,
79
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81 Fitzpatrick, supra note 26, at 1031.
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83 Fitzpatrick, supra note 26, at 1029.
Aili M. Tripp, Women's Movements, Customary Law, and Land Rights in
Uganda, AFR. STUD. Q. 2 (2004), http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i4al.pdf.
85 Toulmin, supra note 9, at 14.
86 Rasna Warah, A Conference in Kigali- On Women's Land PropertyRight During Conflict and Reconstruction, UN CHRONICLE 1998, available at http:/findar84
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ronment. For example, Tanzanian widows who had previously been allowed to stay on their husbands' land are now being dispossessed of that
land as it increases in value.88 In Kenya, loss of property after a husband's
death is reportedly frequent, and in Uganda, widows often experience harassment and property grabbing attempts by their husband's relatives. 89 Current rates of land ownership by women reflect these disturbing trends: for
example, only five percent of Kenyan women own land in their own
names 90 ; in Cameroon the figure is less than ten percent 91 ; in Ghana women
hold ten percent 92; in Lesotho and Swaziland, women are still considered
legal minors. 93
Contemporary deprivation of women's land rights results from conflict-driven and socially-transformative challenges facing traditional communities, and from the current land scarcity. The inability of the state to
effectively enforce more egalitarian systems of rights allows threatened local elites to continue to manipulate customary law to the detriment of women. This dysfunctional dualist system is the context in which development
institutions attempted to simply import a Western-based formal property
titling system, independent from and insensitive to local socio-cultural practices, with a predictable lack of success. The "Catch-22" situation that
emerges is one whereby local elites are sufficiently empowered to administer the formal titling regime that protects women's land rights, but are reluctant to do so because they perceive it as a system that will erode their landKaori Izumi, Liberalisation,Gender and the Land Question in Sub-Saharan
Africa, 7 GENDER & DEv. 9, 13 (Nov. 1999).
89 See Winnie Bikaako & John Ssenkumba, Gender, Land and Rights: Contemporary Contestations in Law, Policy & Practice in Uganda, in WOMEN & LAND IN
AFRICA 233-277 (L. Muthoni Wanyeki ed. 2003); see also Double Standards: Women's Property Violations in Kenya, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/04/29/womens-property-rights-violations88

kenya.
90 Republic of Kenya, Combined Fifth and Sixth Periodic Reports of States Parties to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (39th
Sess., 2007), para. 134, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/KEN/6 (Oct. 16, 2006), availableat
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/39sess.htm (under Kenya).
91 Ernest Harsch, Combating Inequality in Africa, 20 AFRICA RENEWAL 16 (Jul.
2006).
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oriented power base. As discussed below, the chasm between the two systems is significant, and has yet to be successfully navigated.
PART

111:

THE IMPOSITION OF A FORMAL PROPERTY TITLING SYSTEM

Law can fail for one or more of several reasons: if it is poorly constructed, if it is inherently discriminatory, if it fails to reflect the needs or
capacities of certain groups, or if it contravenes custom and practice to
which society assigns a higher priority than formal law, in which case it
will be ignored by those applying it. Several of these reasons are relevant in
the following discussion about the effects of de Soto's titling program in
pluralistic African societies. Part III discusses first the details of de Soto's
regime, its mixed results, its interaction with customary law, and ends with
a discussion on the gender discriminatory impact a gender-neutral system
has on land rights.
A.

Hernando de Soto's Titling Program

Hernando de Soto's restrictive definition of property rights as
"rights, both personal and real, which confer on their holders inalienable
and exclusive entitlement to them" crucially determined the inferences he
drew about informal systems, and the benefits he proposed mere titling
would have on economic growth. 94 He equated informality - any rights falling outside the definition above - with insecurity, the inability for easy
transfer and use of property as collateral, and substantial costs. 95 His solution: "turn property into collateral, collateral into credit, and credit into increased income." 96 Broadly, the perceived benefits of land registration were
identified as: (1) stimulation of efficient land use by increasing tenure security and providing investment incentives; (2) reduction of transaction
costs and the creation of a land market to increase supply and reduce prices;
(3) the creation of a title that could be used as collateral for banks to improve access to credit and safeguard investments; and (4) the provision of
land-holder and land distribution information to governments, allowing the
creation of a property tax system.97
De Soto's status as a leading expert on development secured the
enthusiastic and widespread implementation of his property-rights program,
159 (2002).
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including in Tanzania, Egypt and Peru.98 However, the results of his policy
have proved to be more equivocal.
B.

Results of de Soto's Method

Title deeds have produced positive effects in some countries: Cameroon experienced increased tenure security and less inconsistency between
formal and customary institutions.99 Ethiopian female heads of households
have been able to register land title in the Amhara region, 00 and in Brazil,
titles were perceived to "increase the potential circle of trade."' 0 1 However,
the introduction of formal titling in Brazil and Indonesia also produced a
thirty to eighty percent increase in land values, while the link between titling, investment, and access to credit remained equivocal. 102 In Egypt, legalization increased the value of land by a factor of at least ten, and capital
was transformed into sources of rent, rather than into sources of activity; 03
in Paraguay the gains flowed primarily to wealthy producers;'0 and in Peru
it failed to stimulate investment. 0 5 For example, out of the 200,313 Lima
households awarded land titles in 1998 and 1999, only about twenty-four
percent had received any kind of financing by 2002, which came from the
state rather than the private sector.106
Herald Tagama, Title Deeds Could Unlock Trapped Wealth,

Bus. (Dec.
2004), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa5327/is304/ai-n29142223/.
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De Soto's simple three-step solution described above conceived of
formal titling as the "missing ingredient" for poor markets to work.10 7 The
mixed results - and in some cases, the distinct failure to solve poverty 0 8 have been attributed to multiple factors, two of which are discussed here.
The first factor is the complete reliance on formality, ignoring the fact that
property rights are less authoritative entitlements, and more practically socially embedded processes and products of constant negotiation, contestation and compromise.109 De Soto conceives the poor as being rich in
possessions but not in legal protections,"10 entirely ignoring the extreme
pre-existing discrepancies between individuals and groups in their ability to
exercise their rights. Irrespective of the existing norms, laws, and cultural
institutions, this parachuted approach has proven unsuccessful in several
target states, specifically by increasing land values to the disadvantage of
the already economically disenfranchised. Post-titling land price increases
allow benefits to accrue to those who are already powerful and to wealthy
landowners and landlords, but preclude poor tenants and disadvantaged individuals, such as women, from accessing these benefits because the titles
are conferred on male household heads.
Secondly, characterizing informal property systems as a defective
form of capital ignores its proven advantages, such as increased land accessibility for lower-income groups, the possibility for incremental building
developments, and the general lack of a requirement to purchase land."'
The conclusion accordingly drawn by some is that formal titling "often
[has] disastrous consequences for the poor because individuals with good
political connections can often bypass the land rights of indigenous people,
women, or other vulnerable groups.""l 2
In the alternative, even if formal title was proven manifestly superior to informal title in its effect on investment and development, there are
inherent structural issues that are not easily overcome. The first of these
issues is the scope of the reforms, as limited by other social arrangements.
A formal land registration system, characterized by a written record and
centralized information, necessarily recognizes only those rights and entitlements granted by other formal institutions. Where pre-existing informal
rules continue to regulate other legal relations, such as marriage and inheri107
108
109
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tance, the scope of formal land rights is necessarily reduced. For example,
the Rwandan 1999 Inheritance Law grants equal inheritance rights to sons
and daughters, and provides for the protection of property rights within registered marriage. Registered marriages, however, are still relatively uncommon in Rwanda in comparison to traditional or church marriages and
"consensual union" relationships, so the pool of rights-holders entitled to
equal protection comprises only a minority of the total population.113
Secondly, conventional land registration systems are notoriously
expensive, complex, and slow to be implemented.11 4 Following implementation, continuous funding is required for register maintenance and updating
to ensure record accuracy and reliability. If the cost is borne by the prospective title-holder, then the poorer land owners are doubly disadvantaged:
first, by being prevented from securing their rights formally, and secondly,
because they are exposed to the possibility of a wealthy individual registering title, which will then trump pre-existing customary rights. In Uganda,
privatization and formalization "overextended government capacity, became an unacceptable drain of public funds, and reduced the collateral
value of land due to new uncertainties."" 5 Funding from outside donors
such as development institutions may address the expense issue, but not the
complexity or implementation challenges. Thailand was regarded as a titling "success story" by the World Bank, having issued 8.5 million titles in
the course of a twenty-year titling project.1 6 Collier's research suggests that
countries emerging from conflict cannot afford this time for the effects of
titling implementation to be felt." 7
A third structural concern is that of credit requirements to obtain
loans for land purchase through the formal system. Literacy and collateral
are class- and wealth-dependent prerequisites for loans from financial institutions. Both of these dimensions, while facially gender-neutral, disadvantage women disproportionally. First, literacy is lower among women than
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men,118 and secondly, women-headed households and single women have
little access to credit and other resources, often because of lack of collateral
or the assumption that they will be unable to meet financial obligations in
the absence of a male partner.1 9 In various countries, married women still
need the consent of their husband before taking a loan, a requirement that
violates international human rights law because of its gender discriminatory

effect.120
C.

Titling in the African Context

All of the above obstacles demonstrate that simply imposing Western institutions in developing countries is disconnected from the local context, and necessarily sidelines the underlying power structures and interests
of the society.121 While aid providers are now starting to pay closer attention to the vested interests at play - including threats posed to communal
informal power bases - there is still the additional assumption that local
actors will embrace the change proposed in preference over deeply ingrained cultural traditions. However, in the case of pluralist systems, many
non-state systems are kinship-based, resistant to replacement by formal
state property regimes, and efficient in their own terms. 12 2 The World Bank
now recognizes that, in Africa particularly, the expected benefits from formal land titles did not manifest because of the comprehensive coverage of

customary law.1 2 3
The value of a formal system lies in its uniformity, which provides
consistency, certainty, and incentive for trust. However, straightforward titling programs founded on an exclusionary principle are fundamentally incompatible with the complex, layered relationships that characterize
customary land systems. Simply vesting all rights in one entity - in this
Two-thirds of the world's illiterate are women. U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., Wo(1997), http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/women/women
96.htm.
119 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a
Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to
Non-discrimination, Women and Adequate Housing, 1 29, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2003/
55 (Mar. 26, 2003), availableat available at http://www.unhchr.ch/housing.
120 MARJOLEIN BENSCHOP, UN HABITAT, WOMEN's RIGHTS To LAND AND PROPERTY 2 (2004), available at http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/1556_725
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context, a male household head - ignores underlying issues of power and
legitimacy, while simultaneously depriving certain groups of any land
security.
While in theory, pluralism need not necessarily prevent the evolution of more precise property rights, in practice, post-conflict developing
states "lack[ ] the money, moral authority, or coercive capacity to override
local institutions," resulting in legal and normative pluralistic uncertainty
and conflict.124 Moreover, the collective cost-minimizing and welfare-maximizing community norms are inevitably preferred over formal law,12 5 and
acting in defiance of communal ideals can lead to sanctions such as ostracism and moderate acts of violence.126 In Kenya, the continued adherence to
customary norms in contradiction to the introduced titling system rendered
formal registers inaccurate and irrelevant, and the economic benefits attributable to titling unsustainable.127 In Niger, in land inheritance conflicts between a man and his female relatives, the contradictions between customary
and statutory law are construed in the man's favor.128 Thus, the abolitionist
approach to substitute local custom with legislation is doomed to failure
when the local community views it as "decontextualized, hegemonic, and
counterproductive for gender equality in practice." 29
Since customary law is perceived as maintaining social order, when
legislation is passed without reference to or integration with customary law,
weak states in post-conflict African societies are unable to enforce the new
laws. Rural communities have neither the understanding nor the appreciation of the improvements to their land system, and instead choose wellestablished familiarity over a "remote, predatory, understaffed, underfunded, or otherwise deficient state" system.13 0 For example, although
the Namibian government passed legislation allowing widows to remain in
their houses and on their land after their husband's death, in the absence of
124
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civic education and a commitment to enforcement, customary law continues
to cause the dispossession of widows' matrimonial property.' 3'
The challenges are multiplied because simply imposing a formal
titling regime exacerbates previously existing inaccessibility caused by African bureaucracy, corruption, and slow property procedures.13 2 In Ghana,
registering a land purchase involves multiple visits to five different government offices, so that even those with excellent contacts in government and
the judiciary can wait for more than eighteen months to obtain formal title.' 33 It is not unusual for bureaucrats and strategically placed persons, such
as local chiefs and wealthy urban residents, to claim and title land that previously belonged to poor and uneducated rural families in their name, as
occurred in both Cameroon and Somalia.13 4
D.

Effects of a "Gender Neutral" Property System

Generally across Africa, all of the wealth and class related concerns
that are detailed above are disproportionately experienced by women.' 35
Compounding these concerns is the fact that titling gathers and deposits
"different rights or bundles of rights" in one "owner." 36 Through this process, women typically lose access or cultivation rights to male household
heads who acquire exclusionary control. Primafacie, women have the same
individual formal land rights as males, but women who separate from husbands or become widows often lose both their customary and statutory access and cultivation rights.137 Moreover, because they enter the system
"with no property, little cash income, minimal political power and a family
to maintain," 38 women are systematically disempowered in obtaining land
rights. As highlighted above, purchasing land requires access to credit, and
commercial banks often predicate any loans on clients' literacy or provision
131
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of collateral. Particularly in post-conflict developing societies, women as a
group have been precluded from opportunities to acquire either. 13 9
Indeed, the World Bank has conceded "formal law that requires
gender equity in property rights is mostly ineffective in the face of customary law that does not recognize equitable property rights for men and women" and that "land legislation may conflict with family or personal
law." 40 For example, although the Deed Registry in Swaziland permits
married women, even under customary law, to purchase and register land in
their name, town councils have required husbands to accompany married
women at the time of registration and the husband's name is recorded as the
buyer of the property. Widows and divorcees are even further disempowered because in the absence of a husband, a male "guardian" must
accompany the woman.141
The most critical group in a post-conflict context for economic development is women. Yet, the most vulnerable women - divorcees, widows, and single women who do not have male counterparts - are precisely
the women most frequently excluded. As the Executive Director of Habitat
notes:
[W]omen are still excluded from many of the formal and
legal structures of society and from full participation in economic life. In conflict and post-conflict situations, numbers of women-headed households often increase sharply as
many men have either been killed or are absent. This has
grave results: having no formal rights to land and property
and little voice in governance, women are left without the
means to create stable and sustainable livelihoods. This
contributes to poverty and perpetuates social and political
inequality that can lead to more conflict. Thus, ensuring
equal rights for women is important for peace as well as the
economic well being of all of society.142

Elaine Zuckerman & Marcia Greenberg, The Gender Dimensions of Post-ConGENDER &
DEv. 70, 74 (2004).
140 WORLD BANK, supra note 19, at xi.
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142 Anna Tibaijuka, Foreword to UNIFEM, WOMEN'S LAND AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT AND RECONSTRUCTION 8 (Alfred Buregeya, et
al. eds., 2001) available at http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/Womens
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The World Bank's 2001 Engendering Development report con-

tained several key gender acknowledgments: that gender inequalities impede development, that effective action requires also that policymakers take
account of local realities, and that gender issues must be an integral part of
policy analysis, design, and implementation.14 3 Seven years later, the World
Bank's 2008 World Development Report conceded that affirmative action
may be required to equalize chances to secure women's property rights,
which in turn would improve the effectiveness of natural resources management. 144 It also suggests that "agricultural development actions must be decentralized to tailor them to local conditions," including in the form of
community-driven approaches led by women.14 5 Yet the conclusion, after
decades of various land rights policies to improve growth, is that
"[d]esigning property rights that support efficient land use and recognize
the multiplicity of rights, particularly for women and indigenous groups, is
a highly complex issue that requires further exploration."1 4 6
Almost thirty years after U.N. recognition of the symbiotic relationship between women's advancement and development, the importance of
their economic participation is still not reflected in international financial
institution (IFI) policies, including those of the World Bank. The tendency
has been to impose formal gender-neutral frameworks, which, despite containing language consistent with gender equality, exist independently from
and parallel to gender-discriminatory applied customary law. There is a
conspicuous absence of cohesive strategies prioritizing projects and loans
that target women's rights as critical for stimulating economic development, particularly in numerous post-conflict African countries.
For instance, lending statistics from IFIs, the World Bank, and state
donors demonstrate consistent underfunding. UNIFEM reports that from
2002 to 2007, gender was a sub-theme in less than five percent of World
Bank lending projects, so that while gender may be incorporated in projects,
"gender equality objectives are not indicated amongst the main thematic
focus areas of these programmes."l 4 7 A 2005 report by two non-governmental organizations, Eurostep and Social Watch, found that only 0.1 percent of
James D. Wolfensohn, Foreword to
MENT xi-xii (2001).
143
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1" WORLD BANK, AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT 9, 16 (2008), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2008/Resources/WDR_00_book.pdf.
145 Id. at 20. This is explored further in Part V below.
146 Id. at 139.
147 U.N. Development Fund for Women [UNIFEM], Who Answers to Women?
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Official Development Assistance (ODA) is actually spent on gender equality.148 More specifically, among World Bank Post Conflict Fund grants,
only $3,127,383 (4.67 percent) out of the total of $66,961,254 allocated by
the World Bank to date targeted women, and of 301 Post Conflict Reconstruction projects, only ten of them targeted women as a specific group. 149
The significance of these figures is increased by the fact that public sector
aid has dropped from ninety to twenty to twenty-five percent in the last
twenty years; the remaining seventy-five to eighty percent of developing
aid comes from the private sector.5 0
The failure of development institutions to translate research recommendations into a funding and policy focus on women is problematic because ignoring women as key participants dramatically reduces the efficacy
of any development projects. Moreover, it represents a lost opportunity to
contribute to post-conflict rebuilding in a manner that is most likely to facilitate social acceptance of progressive laws. Since development interventions often occur in transitioning societies when the market system is
dysfunctional,' 5 ' and post-conflict Africa is particularly dependent on aid in
this regard, IFI funding is crucial to the success of resource-dependent measures for social change: enforcement mechanisms, community education
and training, and the fostering of an active and organized civil society.
Rather than merely "incorporating" gender, if the World Bank and other IFI
projects specifically target women as under-utilized economic participants,
the scope, sustainability, and magnitude of economic growth would be substantially enhanced. Allocating a greater proportion of the significant funds
commanded by IFIs would assist with state capacity in oversight and enforcement of fairer legal systems, provide additional resources for community education, and enable structured collaboration between local
communities and governments as called for by local female leaders.152
The potential impact of aid is greatest in post-conflict African economies because of the ability to build transformed gender-sensitive legal,
economic, and social structures consistent with progressive legislation. The
complexities inherent in encouraging changes to custom have proved diffi148

Thalif Deen, Development Financing Still Gender-Blind, IPS NEws, Apr. 4,

2008, available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=42035.
149 Adriana Quinones, Genderand Post-ConflictReconstruction: The World Bank
Track Record (2004).
150 Noeleen Heyzer, Executive Director,UNIFEM, Speech at the Women's Fund-

ing Network Conference (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.unifem.org/
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cult to overcome in the absence of a coherent research-informed framework
backed by the substantial resources commanded by IFIs. The current challenge is to facilitate local acceptance of new norms; this acceptance will
ultimately be achieved with a mixture of enforcement and community initiatives, all of which require technical expertise and resources. A focus on
these avenues by development institutions could provide the necessary momentum to overcome the "Catch-22" encapsulated in the local-universal dialogue. As demonstrated below, there is internal pressure to change, and
women have made some progress, mainly through formal institutions that
are already more receptive to notions of gender equality than customary
law.
PART

IV:

LEGAL REFORM POSSIBILITIES AND PRACTICE

Post-conflict African countries dominate the "bottom billion" club:
economic growth is non-existent and the stabilizing social structures have
been intentionally or incidentally destroyed, with the state apparatus dismembered and the traditional male decision-making population decimated.
Entrenched gender discriminatory customary practices may still be present,
and yet "[t]he post-war reconstruction phase can be an opportune time to
reform or improve land tenure systems that lead to war and conflict in the
first place . . . [slince women are often forced into nontraditional roles dur-

ing conflict, these new roles can be consolidated to create a new place for
women in society as decision makers, developers and peacemakers." 5 3
Thus, the best prospects for development institutions to promote sustainable
development and post-conflict reconstruction lie in developing an integrated legal system that protects women's rights. Part IV explores the lessons learned from three post-conflict societies that have attempted to
reconcile the differences between customary and formal property rights.
A.

The Rwanda Context

With the highest population density in Africa, a rural population
comprising ninety-five percent of the total population, and a customary lawbased system that is undergoing almost total reconstruction after conflict,
Rwanda offers a powerful case study for the analysis of women's land
rights. As a former French colony, the Rwandan legal system is characterized by co-existing systems of (unwritten) customary and (written) statutory
law.15 4 This uneasy balance frequently gives rise to contradictions and inWarah, supra note 86.
154 Rwanda, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/rw.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2011).
153

2011

ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS

103

consistencies. Judges do not always know localized customary law, and local authorities are not always willing to implement judges' decisions that
are based on a formal law that theoretically supersedes customary law.'55
In the area of land law, most land continues to be acquired through
localized customary rules of occupation. Although individual property
rights under customary tenure have shifted from user rights to ownership
rights, most land is obtained through inheritance, a land grant, loan, or community sale.'5 6 Generally, only a minority of landholders have sufficient
resources to apply for and pay for a land title. 5 7 This shift to ownership
rights precipitated land fragmentation because males increasingly inherited
land as a right and not just for sustenance. That land was incessantly subdivided for inheritance by male heirs.' 58
Rwanda's customary patrilineal system precludes women from inheriting, owning or controlling land, and consequently, from applying for
agricultural credit. Accordingly, women's land rights were contingent upon
the good will of in-laws or consanguinal family members. Importantly,
marriages are legal only if they are contracted at a district office, a bureaucratic and expensive process, and are deemed "illegal" or "non-legal" even
if the marriage is performed at a church or according to tradition.
In the wake of the 1994 conflict, in some areas of the country between one-third and half of the women became widows, and thirty-four
percent of households became female-headed (an increase of fifty percent
since 1991). Of these female-headed household heads, widows comprised
more than sixty percent.159 In the turmoil of the reconstruction period, customary norms were often inadequate to accommodate re-forming communities in which an unprecedented number of women were required to assume
leadership roles:
[P]ostwar transition in Rwanda ... created an open space in
which, by urgent necessity, these [customary] rules and
[cultural] practices had to be radically reinvented. Importantly, this space provided women, who had endured some
disadvantages under prewar customary land law, with many
'5 Laurel Rose, Women's Land Access in Post-ConflictRwanda: Bridging the Gap
Between Customary Land Law and Pending Land Legislation, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN

& L. 197, 203, 208 (2004).
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new opportunities, but also with some constraints, for addressing their limitations within Rwanda's land control hierarchy and for reinventing customary land law on a case-

by-case basis. 16 0
Reflective of this gender inversion, female Rwandan parliamentarians now comprise the highest proportion in the world;161 in 2008, women
secured fifty-six percent of the seats - the first female majority in the
world.162 Statutory law now provides for widows to assume their husband's
land rights, unmarried women to inherit land (if the sole surviving descendent of the patrilineal group), and married women who are only children to
inherit their parents' land.'6 3 On the other hand, considerable discretionary
powers were extended to the Council of Succession to deny, limit, or rescind such inheritance rights. M
In recognition of women's postwar land needs, the government also
introduced the imidugudu land policy, which provided housing to femaleheaded households without discrimination, and in some cases in preference
to male-headed households. Again, discretionary powers to grant or deny
land rights to prospective or current residents were granted to local authorities.165 A similar mixed result is observable in the Organic Land Law,
adopted in 2005, which states that men and women have equal rights to
land, but contains no corresponding enforcement mechanism.166
There are other challenges to true equality. As mentioned above,
formal inheritance laws only apply to those who are married under civil
law, which excludes the majority of the adult female population as well as
those practicing polygamy, which is relatively common in some parts of
Rwanda.16 7 In addition, Rwanda's legal system is not adequately equipped
160

Id. at 211.
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Elizabeth Powley, United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF], Rwanda: The

Impact of Women Legislators on Policy Outcomes Affecting Childrenand Families

(Dec. 2006), http://www.unicef.org/sowc07/docs/powley.pdf (last visited Aug. 16,
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162 UNIFEM, Rwandan Women Secure 56% of ParliamentarySeats in Historic

Election Result (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.unifem.org/news-events/story-detail.
php?StorylD=736 (last visited Aug. 16, 2011).
163 See Law on MatrimonialRegimes, Liberalities and Successions, 2000, C. Civ.
No. 22/99 (Rwanda), arts. 9, 50.
164 Id., art. 75.
165 See Rose, supra note 155, at 214-15.
166 BROWN & UVUZA, supra note 113, at 2-3.
167 Id. at 15.
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to deal with the volume and complexity of land cases, and local authorities
are often reluctant to enforce controversial decisions. 168
Nevertheless, most women who have assumed control of households and communities after war have asserted greater land rights than are
specified under either customary or formal law.' 69 Many women took advantage of uncertain postwar legal conditions to access their birth home
land, or their deceased or ex-husband's land, reinventing customary land
law or applying new standards in anticipation of more equitable legislation
on a case-by-case basis.170
Land reform in the Rwandan context highlights both the potential
for progress and the limits of change dictated by pre-existing cultural
norms. Local power structures are typically resistant to change, which has
tempered the scope and unconditionality of more equitable provisions.
However, the proven capacity of women to use transitional uncertainty to
consolidate their access to land suggests that the heightened social malleability and acceptance of women's rights in post-conflict rebuilding is a context within which further progress is possible.
B.

The Mozambique Context

Customary law in Mozambique exists in both matrilineal (in the
north) and patrilineal (in the south) forms. Across both systems, women are
prevented from owning their own land because control rights are vested
with her husband or maternal uncles or nephews.' 7' Despite the 1975 government denunciation of customary law as "backward and superstitious,"
customary norms are still adhered to, particularly in relation to inheritance
rights, the division of labor, and gender power dynamics. 7 2
After emerging in 1992 from sixteen years of internal conflict,
Mozambique began reconstructing its institutions and distributing land
among small-scale farmers, who generate ninety-nine percent of agriculture
and are the mainstay of the economy.173 The war had forced hundreds of
168
169
170
171
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Id. (citing interview with Ismael Ossemane, Vice-President of the Nat'l Peasants' Union of Mozam. (1996)).
173 Mozambique: Women Still Struggle for Land Rights Despite New Law, IRIN
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thousands of rural people to abandon their homes, often taking refuge near
towns or in peri-urban slums and leaving villages deserted for years at a
time. The government's post-conflict policy of encouraging people to "return to the land"l 74 meant many single, divorced, and widowed women returned to farm the land, but without any legal protections. Three processes
facilitated direct control over land by some women: first, the government
redistributed lands abandoned during the conflict to local families, including those headed solely by women; second, widowed or abandoned wives
were able to return unchallenged to the land of their former husbands; and
third, returning males migrating to different areas married local women, a
reversal of the previous custom whereby women left their local community
upon marriage.17 5
Prior to 1997, land disputes, which arose frequently in the years
immediately after the conflict, required written evidence to substantiate
claims of land use. Most rural farmers, especially women, did not have
access to written contracts since over seventy percent of women in
Mozambique cannot read or write. Moreover, bureaucratic processes and a
scarcity of courts and legal advice in the rural areas made access to the
justice system difficult and complicated. 7 6
The 1997 Land Law was a major breakthrough because it combined
formal and customary law. In addition to the traditional recognition of written documents in land usage cases, it recognized customary tenure systems
and the rights of people who had occupied land for over ten years in good
faith.' 77 It also established procedures for delimitation and registration of
community land rights to be implemented through a village lands registration regime with minimal funding. The procedures built on existing villageReportld=69845&Country=Yes. An estimated 68% or about 12.5 million people
live in rural areas. Rural households are predominantly smallholders who provide
about 95% of agricultural GDP with the balance from a small number of medium
and large commercial farms. WORLD BANK, MOZAMBIQUE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 3 (2006).
174 See Anna Wardman, The Co-Operative Movement in Chokwe, Mozambique, II
J.S. AFR. STUD. 295, 299 (1985).
17 Waterhouse, supra note 171, at 48-49.
176 Leonard Maveneka, Mozambique's Family Law Passes!, OXFAM INT'L, http://
www.oxfam.org/en/programs/development/safrica/moz_1aw.htm (last visited Jun.
12, 2011).
177 That is, occupation in the belief that no one else had rights to the occupied land
could be regarded as legally belonging to the occupier; however, women struggle in
practice to enforce this right. See Mozam. law no. 19/97 ch, 3 art, 2, available at
http://www.mozambiquecalanga.co.za/mozambiquelandlaw_1egislation.pdf.
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level structures and relied on a large number of volunteers who were trained
as paralegal guides.178
However, inadequate educational initiatives have undermined rural
communities' awareness and exercise of their improved rights, as well as
the effectiveness of the institutional processes.179 Local justice is usually
delivered through male elders in forums to which women have no access.
Efforts to reconcile the two systems produced provisions permitting, but not
requiring, co-titling and women's recognition as members of rural communities. These provisions perpetuated land security problems faced by widows upon their husband deaths. 80 In dealing with inheritance and marriage,
the introduced legislation applies only to common-law (formal) marriages
since it does not recognize customary law. Since the majority of women
were married under customary law, they cannot benefit from the new
provisions. 181
Another major breakthrough subsequently occurred in December
2003 when the new Family Law was passed, protecting informal unions
between men and women. Under the new law, women who have lived with
their partners for more than a year are entitled to inherit the property of
their husbands.182 The remaining challenge, as always, is the meaningful
enforcement of these laudable laws. To date, as explored in other publications based on primary research,' 83 civil society organizations have been
bridging the gap between formal equality in law and access to justice in
practice with varying levels of success. For example, while court verdicts
are invariably in favor of women's land rights, enforceability of these decisions remains a challenge for both divorcees and widows.184
C.

The Uganda Context

Uganda's patrilineal customary inheritance law provides for a
widow to receive fifteen percent of her deceased husband's estate, although
178
179

180
181
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this percentage is often withheld in practice.' 85 "Under customary law a
widow may be 'inherited' by her in-laws and forced to marry a male relative," or ejected along with her children from her home.186 As in other patrilineal societies, women are unable to otherwise control land.' 87
In 1986, after years of human rights abuses, conflict, and a guerilla
war that brought Yoweri Museveni into power, a new era embracing female
civic participation began. Broad legal reforms ensuring female representation in decision-making bodies' 88 culminated in the 1995 Ugandan Constitution, which prohibits "laws, . . . customs or traditions which are against

the dignity, welfare or interest of women" 8 9 - a landmark in legal protection of women's rights.
In terms of property law, the 1998 Uganda Land Act includes a
number of progressive provisions, which include the following: (1) requiring the prior written consent of both spouses in transactions involving family holdings; (2) prohibiting decisions pertaining to customary land that
deny women access to, ownership of, or occupation of land; and (3) requiring the Uganda Land Commission to have out of its five members at least
one female member, one-third of each District Land Board to be women,
one-quarter of each parish land committee to be female, and one-third of the
Communal Land Management Association to be female. Each of these bodies deals with communal land ownership and management.190
The structure of the tenure system is among the most extensive and
decentralized in the entire continent, involving district land boards supported by a network of 4,500 local land committees.191 However, women's
activist groups have been unsuccessful on two occasions in their campaign
for the Land Act to include a co-ownership clause.19 2
None of the three countries discussed above have enacted
mandatory co-ownership laws to protect divorcees and widows.1 93 However, it is nonetheless clear that formal systems provide the initial critical
Now, Uganda: Exclusion of Women from Land Ownership - The
"Lost Clause["] (Aug. 2000), http://www.equalitynow.org/english/actions/action_1701 _en.html (last visited Jun. 12, 2011).
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legal framework for women to claim rights when customary law leaves
them landless; the more challenging issue is how to enhance social receptivity to these formal changes. While there are variations across cultures and
countries, commonalities in post-conflict African societies - such as uncertain social structures, land scarcity, and entrenched power dynamics that
systemically disadvantage women - make it particularly important that
rights are not dependent on familial or community relations. Instead, these
rights should be based on objective criteria that protect the most vulnerable.
PART

V: FUSING

THE SYSTEMS

- TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Development institutions, and particularly the World Bank, conceded years ago that the gulf between different systems of rights and between law and practice must be bridged if women are to enjoy secure land
rights.194 Moreover, research consistently affirms the critical role women
must play in the economy for growth and development to occur. In pluralist
African societies, customary law must be considered by any effective developmental strategy: either to better pursue eventual titling, registration and

privatization of individual land ownership, as favored by the World Bank,
or as a way to strengthen and democratize local communities, as proposed
by Oxfam.1 95

I have characterized this pluralist context as a "Catch-22" because
development policies in the last four decades have targeted both local structures and central governments without achieving a coherent property rights
system that promotes economic growth or development in the "bottom billion" countries. This dilemma is more pronounced in the context of promoting and protecting women's land rights, which runs counter to
contemporary interpretations of custom. Although custom has historically
provided communally acceptable land rights for women, experiences with
land scarcity, population growth, and increased commercialization suggest
that malleable power in the hands of the local elite will continue to prevent
tenure and economic security for women under customary law. I do not
pretend to have a solution - achieving any degree of development in this
context has proven elusive even for international development experts - but

by extracting some lessons from the case studies discussed, there may be
additional and alternative methods to solve this "insoluble" problem. I
structure my suggestions around three main challenges.
The first of these challenges is the reluctance of local authorities to
implement gender-equal formal law that contradicts custom. This reluctance
"9 See supra Part I.C.
'95 Tripp, supra note 84, at 1-2.

110

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 17

could be alleviated if the central state competently oversaw and enforced
legislation. The second obstacle is the lack of state capacity to perform
oversight and enforcement functions; given the existence of gender-sensitive formal law in several post-conflict African states,196 however, the ability to guarantee rights could be addressed by financial resources, and
training and monitoring enforcement regimes. The proposals below are
predicated on the assumption that less institutional capacity is required to
oversee local distribution of justice than would be needed to administer the
law, hear cases, provide staff, and dispense justice centrally. The third challenge is the failure to date by IFIs and development agencies to direct substantial resources into policies that prioritize the improvement of rights
protection for women without secure land ownership. Accordingly, the prescriptions explored below focus specifically on areas in which IFI conditional funding could promote gender equality in the structure and content of
both customary and formal land, marriage, and inheritance law. The scope
of the integrated system must encompass and be accessible to all women single, divorced, and widowed - and must be recognized and enforced both
by formal institutions and at the local and state levels.
A.

Content of the Protections

Women require the certainty and predictability of a modem, national system of land legislation that "specifies and guarantees their land
rights as a class of citizens and as individuals with different interests." 9 7 An
effective system must redress institutional discrepancies between customary
and formal law, in addition to historical, social, and economic gender disparities such as literacy and access to credit. While development institutions
cannot guarantee legal reform, conditioning financial and strategic support
of government initiatives on implementing the recommendations below
could be a powerful incentive for central governments to focus on women's
rights as a mechanism promoting greater economic prosperity.198
Entitlements: Formal rights should universally and independently
guarantee access to individual land titles for women so the foundational
capacity to own property is legally recognized. Emulating the positive
Tanzanian and South African experiences, married couples should be required by the state to jointly register title as co-owners to ensure that wo196

In countries where the state does not have the will to provide gender equality,

the approaches to promote gender equality are necessarily far more complicated,
and beyond the scope of this paper.
197 Rose, supra note 155, at 241.
198 As noted in Part I above, this approach by development institutions has almost
completely determined aid-dependent government development policies in the past.
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men's interests in property cannot be forfeited. As has worked in
Mozambique, women who return to abandoned land previously occupied by
their husband's family or their own family after conflict should be entitled
to claim title to that land without challenge. This system limits the need to
redistribute land among the mostly female post-conflict community, and
dispenses with the requirement for evidence, which is likely to be inaccessible or non-existent. Divorced women should be entitled to half the matrimonial property upon separation so they can continue to occupy their
homes and support themselves and their family.199 Building on the provisions in the 1998 Uganda Land Act, sales of family land by husbands
should require written consent of the wife and two government land officials (one male and one female). Women should be able to unconditionally
inherit land through a standardized procedure. If group rights continue to be
awarded, they should articulate the obligations of individuals within the
group as well as the mechanisms by which these are specified or can be
changed. 200 Government policies could ensure housing is provided so that it
does not discriminate against female-headed households, and, as in
Rwanda, prefer them in certain circumstances. 20 1 Similarly, the redistribution of unclaimed abandoned land could prefer female-headed households,
as recommended in Mozambique. 2 02
Finances:Development institutions could adopt the Grameen Bank
template and as a policy provide credit to women on analogous financial
terms, prioritizing females who are most vulnerable - single women,
divorcees and widows - as recipients without requiring collateral and literacy. Microfinance institutions have already proven successful in empowering women who otherwise would be excluded from borrowing capital to
develop small enterprises generating regular income. 203 Similarly, pre-existing credit projects could be modified to target women. The World Bank's
post-conflict reconstruction credit programs, such as the World Bank Sierra
Leone Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery Credit Project (III), should
be modified so the infrastructure, knowledge, and processing capacity can
be applied almost immediately to schemes that specifically target women.
Prioritizing women in titling programs and land reform in Latin American
programs has stimulated substantive change. For example, Chile, Colombia,
See
See
201 See
202 See
199
200

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 89, at 25.
DEININGER, supra note 25, at 51-52.

Rose, supra note 155, at 214.
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203 See Grameen Bank at a Glance (Mar. 2011), http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=26&Itemid=175 (last visited Jun.
12, 2011).
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and Nicaragua give priority and charge lower fees to female household
heads in land-related interventions. 2 04
Further, institutional funding could be tied to achieving quotas in
the proportion of titles issued to males and females within prescribed time
frames. This linkage would guarantee the preferencing of women even if
the titling process is slow. Single, divorced, and widowed women would be
further protected through their prioritized status in the process. Institutional
funding would also counteract the reluctance of local banks to lend under
reformed laws that promote gender equality. 205
B.

Scope of the Protections

The scope must be as expansive as possible, and framed in
mandatory terms. Joint registration of title establishing co-ownership for
couples is essential to protect wives within marriages from possible future
dispossession. While in common law this is recognized as joint tenancy, in
civil law systems - including Rwanda - the legal relationship is called ton-

tine.206 The introduced system should resonate with the existing legal structure. Formal law must recognize customary marriages if the protections are
to be available to women most in need. These protections are in place in
both Tanzania (after two years of co-habitation) and Uganda (after ten years
of monogamous co-habitation). 2 07 Unoccupied, unused state-owned land
could be made available for purchase and titling; public land occupied in
good faith for a substantial period of time, as in Mozambique, should be
recognized and formalized.
C.

Recognition and Enforcement

The importance of creating and maintaining institutions for enforcement cannot be overstated. African governments have struggled to implement a large-scale national land registration system successfully. 208 The
current low levels of documentation, underdeveloped institutional capacity,
and vulnerability to wealth and gender bias suggest that fair and effective
204
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Ann Varley, Gender and Property Formalization: Conventional and Alternative Approaches, 35 WORLD DEV. 1739, 1747-48 (2007).
206 See, e.g., James Brooke, Informal CapitalismGrows in Cameroon,N.Y. TIMES,
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Nov. 3, 1987, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/30/business/informalcapitalism-grows-in-cameroon.html.
207 This ten-year period of time is overly demanding and further progress is needed
to reflect greater gender equality. See BROWN & UVUZA, supra note 113.
208 See Toulmin, supra note 9, at 10.
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centralized land systems are a distant goal for many post-conflict African
countries. In contrast, local structures are cheap, flexible, perceived as legitimate, 209 and are effective centers for rights administration and dispute resolution. While a unified system may be the ultimate goal, establishing locally
tailored procedures that can be upgraded over time offers a more immediate
remedy to women entering the land market during the critical post-conflict
reconstruction period. Supporting local institutional intermediate land titling has proven effective in both Nigeria and Ethiopia, 2 10 but the risk of the
"politics of exclusion" of the least powerful - typically women, migrants,
tenants, and pastoralists - is one that still requires adequate legal safeguarding against.
Certain factors consistently emerge as critical for an effective system: establishing a process after thorough local community consultations,
using decentralized and local management, building on existing local institutions, using the local language, granting minimum discretionary powers to
local elites in their administrative responsibilities, ensuring substantive
downward accountability, protecting low fees to users, providing for periodic updating, and providing for easy detection and penalization for abuse
of power and discrimination. 211 These measures focus on implementation at
the local level, but allow for central oversight and enforcement of laws protecting women's rights if required.
Implementing complementary measures ensuring transparency and
downward accountability (democratization) to protect against abuse by local elites requires vesting rights in individuals, with central government
oversight of local bodies. This can be partly achieved through female representation in local institutions such as land committees and local governments. For instance, the locally devolved Tanzanian system ensures that
women are represented in land administration and adjudication bodies, as
does the Ugandan structure described above. 212
Similarly, primary research in Tanzania suggests that when women
are in leadership positions within the community, such as being the community leader, vulnerable women such as divorcees and widows are highly

likely to have their land rights respected. 2 13 The central government can
then re-direct resources that would otherwise be engaged in a burdensome
registration system into appropriate and responsive enforcement mechaSee Jean-Phillipe Platteau, Does Africa Need Land Reform?, in EVOLVING
LAND RIGHTS, POLICY AND TENURE 72 (2000); Toulmin, supra note 9, at 17.
210 Toulmin, supra note 9, at 10-11.
211 See id. at 17.
212 Tripp, supra note 84, at
4.
213 See Kapur, supra note 183, at 19.
209
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nisms. This oversight may thus reduce corruption, exclusion, and subversion of the law by local elites. Further, extensive management at the local
level builds on existing structures, relationships, and cultural practices. The
initial focus could be on "introducing simple written contracts with agreed
basic terms," 2 14 which would require verbal confirmation of the terms by a
government official in order to accommodate issues of illiteracy.
Well-funded, expansive educational campaigns that reach women
in rural areas are critical to local adoption. For example, the limits to progress in Mozambique and Namibia stem from "insufficient investment by
the state in informing rural community members of their rights and supporting local procedures . . . ."215 Development institutions would increase the
efficacy of their entire investment by ensuring that the local communities
and decision-making bodies - both formal and customary - are aware of the
rights granted, how they affect customary law, and which enforcement
mechanisms apply.
The final and most intransigent avenue for progress is promoting
local willingness to effectively use formal institutions. One goal should be
gender inclusion at all state levels, from land committees to local government staff to state-level political representation. In addition to this inclusion, strategic and financial support of non-state actors by IFIs could be
instrumental in empowering local groups to maintain the pressure for
change. In the past,"[w]omen have successfully formed informal groups,
associations, or cooperatives to secure their rights, protect or acquire more
land . . . ."216 For example, "[i]n Burkina Faso, Ghana, Uganda, and
Tanzania, women, lawyers' associations and civil society groups have ...
agitat[ed] for women's property rights, educating the populace, bringing
test cases .

.

. to court and promoting the enforcement of laws that protect

women's property." 217 Gender specialists advocate for the use of paralegals
at the local level to promote women's rights with support from the NGO
community. 218
The above considerations are by no means exhaustive; the specific
cultural, political, and social context will in each case facilitate some initiatives and hinder others. However, there is a growing body of evidence from
which to extract successful policies and highlight possible obstacles. The
correct formula of substantive protections and procedural reforms required
Toulmin, supra note 9, at 17.
Sjaastad &Cousins, supra note 101, at 7; see also Joireman, supra note 100, at
1241.
216 Lastarria-Cornhiel, supra note 67, at 1327.
217 Joireman, supra note 100, at 1241.
218 See Varley, supra note 205, at 1749 and Kapur, supra note 183, at 20.
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may vary. Nevertheless, addressing the content of protections, financially
enabling women, broadening the scope, and paying particular attention to
enforcement at the local level are universally critical for any effective property-focused development policy.
CONCLUSION

The remarkable diversity between regions and countries in the African continent precludes the successful importation of a one-size-fits-all approach to addressing gender equality in land rights. Development
institutions, heavily influenced by World Bank research, ideology, and policies, have been slow to appreciate the importance of customary laws and
the risks of ignoring local power structures. Unsurprisingly, legislation explicitly enshrining gender equality has proven insufficient to guarantee women equal access to property rights. This insufficiency is partly due to the
failure of development policies to translate research and rhetoric into funding and interventions supporting women's economic participation.
Today, there is enough evidence in various African post-conflict
pluralist societies to constructively inform development strategies and funding. The reliance of post-conflict states on private funding guarantees the
enormous capacity of development institutions to shape laws, institutions
and policies. It is disappointing that development funding has not capitalized on the potential of women to be a driving force for economic growth,
nor developed a comprehensive understanding of how to empower women
as economic participants. This potential is amplified in post-conflict societies where women are central actors in rebuilding communities in desperate
need of effective development policies and financial resources to avoid relapses into violence. The characteristic uncertainty in transitional societies
provides the greatest opportunity to re-shape custom and social norms that
promote gender equality and economic growth.
This paper has explored the different structures and experiences of
post-conflict African countries and extracted strategies that could inform a
coherent World Bank approach to land law that ensures women's rights. It
suggests that gender equality needs to be specifically targeted in land administration development projects in a culturally sensitive manner in order
to minimize local resistance to formal legal systems. Where customary law
does not recognize gender equitable property rights, and land legislation
conflicts with personal or family law, implementation must provide meaningful protection of women's land rights. Utilizing local structures to administer policies is pragmatically and socially imperative, but the power to
determine the content of and enforce property rights must necessarily shift
from local elites to central institutions.
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The "Catch-22" situation that this current system creates is demonstrated across pluralist Africa today: how will local structures be persuaded
to apply principles of gender equality in land law, contradictory to the custom already entrenched, validated, and enforced? The answer is multi-faceted, long-term, and involves a diversity of actors. In post-conflict
communities, the central government is often willing to embrace gender
equality, highly mobilized and capable women and organizations can be
found, and traditional culture is being re-negotiated. These circumstances
are precisely those in which development aid is needed the most, capable of
the most, and politically able to target the most important and underutilized
resource - the female population. Unfortunately, there are all too many contexts where conflict has wreaked havoc on economic prosperity; let us hope
that development aid starts targeting those who matter most to both peace
and development.

